Bernanke forsøgte også at re-formulere Taylor-reglen (den pengepolitiske tommelfingerregel, der groft forenklet siger, at væksten i pengemængden skal være lig med vækst i bruttonationalproduktet plus inflationen). I stedet for den faktiske inflation forsøger Bernanke at rationalisere pengepolitikken med centralbankens forventede inflation.
Professor John B. Taylor svarer Bernanke i WSJ (10/1). På den tekniske side afviser Taylor, at centralbankens inflationsforventninger er bedre end den faktiske inflation. Centralbanken undervurderede inflationen. Men mere fundamentalt giver Taylor udtryk for bekymring over Bernankes tilgangs mulige indflydelse på fremtidige bobler:
"Inflation was increasing, even excluding skyrocketing housing prices. Yet even when inflation is low, the damage of boom-bust monetary policy can be severe as Milton Friedman stressed in his strong criticism of the Fed in the 1950s and 1960s. Stepping back from the fray, an objective observer of all this evidence would have to at least admit the possibility that monetary policy was too easy and a possible contributor to the crisis.
Not admitting the possibility raises concerns. One is that if such a large deviation from standard policy is rationalized away, it might happen again. Indeed, some analysts are worried now about the Fed holding interest rates too low for too long, causing another boom-bust and a shorter expansion.
Another concern is that, rather than trying to be vigilant and avoid causing bubbles, the Fed will try to burst them with interest rates. Indeed, one of the lines from Mr. Bernanke's speech most picked up by Fed watchers is that "we must remain open to using monetary policy as a supplementary tool for addressing those risks." We have very limited ability to fine tune monetary policy in such an interventionist way.
Finally, there is a concern that the line of analysis in Mr. Bernanke's speech puts the full burden of preventing future bubbles on new regulation. Clearly the Fed missed excessive risks on and off the balance sheets of the banks that it supervises and regulates. That policy needs to be corrected. However, it is wishful thinking that some new and untried macro-prudential systemic risk regulation will prevent bubbles".Se i øvrigt tidligere indlæg om Taylor-reglen og pengepolitikken her og her.